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RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES:  









Indian officials warned the people of Kashmir to start preparing for a 
nuclear war between Pakistan and India following “cross-border 
skirmishes” that resulted in the death of three Pakistani and two Indian 
soldiers in early 2013.1 A war between India and Pakistan might not be 
surprising—the two nations have already fought several wars against 
each other2—but the main catalyst for this potential nuclear feud might 
be: water.3 Pakistan, desperate for water, fears that India is cutting off 
some of Pakistan’s precious water supply.4 Because of this fear, one 
Pakistani militant group adopted inflammatory slogans such as "water 
flows or blood."5 This belligerent rhetoric comes despite the fact that the 
two nations previously negotiated a treaty designed to resolve their water 
dispute.6  
This shift towards using violence and intimidation in the 
transboundary water dispute between India and Pakistan7 indicates a 
general trend towards the same throughout the world.8 As the world’s 
supply of fresh water decreases and as demand increases, upstream 
																																								 																					
* J.D., 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. The author would like 
to thank Professor Eric Talbot Jensen, whose expertise and suggestions were invaluable in writing 
this Comment.   
1 Gardiner Harris, India Warns Kashmiris to Prepare for Nuclear War, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/world/asia/indian-officials-advise-
preparations-for-possible-war.html. 
2 Niharika Mandhana, Water Wars: Why India and Pakistan Are Squaring Off Over Their 
Rivers, TIME (Apr. 16, 2012), available at 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2111601,00.html (noting that there have been 
“three post-independence wars between the hostile nuclear neighbors”). 
3 Palash Ghosh, What Are India And Pakistan Really Fighting About?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 
27, 2013, 5:52 AM), available at http://www.ibtimes.com/what-are-india-pakistan-really-fighting-
about-1520856 (“[T]he dominant overriding conflict between India and Pakistan lies with the 
simplest, but most crucial, necessity of life: water.”); Lydia Polgreen & Sabrina Tavernise, Water 
Dispute Increases India-Pakistan Tension, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/asia/21kashmir.html?pagewanted=all. 
4 See generally Polgreen & Tavernise, supra note 3. 
5 Mandhana, supra note 2. 
6 See Polgreen & Tavernise, supra note 3. 
7 The term “transboundary disputes” will be used to refer to disputes among border-sharing 
nations.  
8  See e.g. Water Conflict Chronology List, PAC. INST., available at 
http://www2.worldwater.org/conflict/list/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (listing every known 
international water dispute from 3000 BC to 2012 AD, and demonstrating that there have been an 
increasing number of violent water disputes in recent years). 
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nations (like India) are more likely to hoard water.9 Downstream nations 
(like Pakistan) will likely start taking any necessary actions—including 
violence—to obtain fresh water supplies for their citizens. Consequently, 
the international community ought to establish a method of resolving 
transboundary water disputes that will prevent violence and promote 
cooperation among the disputing nations. 
The international community currently has two main dispute 
resolution methods, but neither method can adequately deal with all of 
the major issues inherent to transboundary water disputes. The two 
traditional methods for resolving transboundary water disputes are first, 
negotiating treaties, and second, referring the disputes to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Both methods allow nations to 
maintain a high level of autonomy because each disputing party must 
consent to be bound by the methods or else the methods would have no 
effect. This high level of autonomy comes at a price, though, because 
under these traditional resolution methods, the international community 
has no power to appropriate water among disputing parties in the event 
that the parties do not reach an agreement on their own and fail to submit 
the dispute to the ICJ. Obviously any dispute resolution mechanism that 
allows the international community to settle a water dispute without the 
consent of the disputing parties would limit those parties’ autonomy. 
However, an efficient, yet forceful, dispute resolution mechanism could 
lessen the severity of the limitation on autonomy.  
While there are obvious differences between the way nations interact 
with the international community and the way states10 interact with their 
federal governments,11 there are also similarities that make it worthwhile 
to use the federalist system as a guide for how the international 
community can successfully resolve difficult transboundary water 
disputes in the least intrusive manner possible.12 Moreover, the American 
and Canadian methods of resolving interstate water disputes can be 
instructive for how the international community might resolve 
transboundary water disputes in the future, due to their differing 
approaches to federal water law.  
This Comment will suggest that, although the international 
community should continually strive to allow nations to arbitrate, 
mediate, and otherwise negotiate water treaties among themselves, some 																																								 																					
9 A 2012 report from the United States Intelligence Director stated that “[w]e judge that the use 
of water as a weapon will become more common during the next 10 years with more powerful 
upstream nations impeding or cutting off downstream flow.” INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
ASSESSMENT, GLOBAL WATER SECURITY 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Special%20Report_ICA%20Global%20Water%20Security.pdf.
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
10 The term “state” will be used in this paper to refer only to local governments within a federal 
system.  It will never be used to refer to states in the global meaning of the term.  
11  Most importantly, states delegate some of their sovereignty to a unifying federal 
government, whereas there is no such government to which nations have delegated their sovereignty.  
12 Most importantly, both states and nations share sources of natural resources with other 
equally sovereign entities without necessarily sharing any cultural or political ties with any of those 
entities.   
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transboundary water disputes require the international community to 
follow the American Congress’ example of taking a more active role in 
resolving the disputes. Specifically, this Comment will suggest that, in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter, the UN Security Council 
should appropriate water between disputing nations in certain 
circumstances. As is the case with Congressional appropriation in the 
United States, the UN Security Council’s appropriation should be 
binding, but flexible—disputing nations should be able to override the 
appropriation if they are able to agree to a different appropriation later 
on. This appropriation scheme would allow nations to maintain a high 
level of autonomy while also allowing the international community to 
prevent outbreaks of violence related to transboundary water disputes. 
Part II of this Comment will emphasize the need for international 
cooperation in appropriating water among bordering nations. Part III will 
examine relevant scholarship pertaining to transboundary water disputes. 
Parts IV and V will analyze the methods of resolving interstate water 
disputes in the United States and Canada, respectively. Part VI will 
analyze how the federalist methods of dispute resolution could work on 
an international level, and Part VII will propose that the Security Council 
should, in certain circumstances, unilaterally appropriate water among 
disputing nations. Finally, Part VIII will defend this proposal from likely 
criticisms, and Part IX will provide a concluding summary.  
 
II. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION  
IN WATER APPROPRIATION 
 
The international community is well aware of the need for 
cooperation in water appropriation.13 In fact, the UN established 2013 as 
the International Year of Water Cooperation. 14  Although the UN 
celebrates the fact that there has been cooperation regarding water 
appropriation in the past fifty years—as evidenced by the fact that there 
have been over 150 water treaties signed in that time frame15—it also 
acknowledges that there have been thirty-seven “acute disputes involving 																																								 																					
13 Indeed, some scholars have argued that the international community has not only understood 
the need to cooperate when settling disputes, but has been so successful in meeting this need that the 
community has created a network of cooperation. See e.g. Anne Peters, International Dispute 
Settlement: A Network of Co-operational Duties, EUR. J. INT’L L. (Feb. 2003), available at 
https://advance.lexis.com/GoToContentView?requestid=ade028a2-9f43-7dca-75fb-
48ab64694975&crid=301f9342-2315-46c7-bb79-66a6fdb392ae (arguing that “the international law 
of dispute settlement is not only built on co-operation, but even constitutes a network, as political 
scientists understand the term”). 
14 International Year of Water Cooperation, G.A. Res. 65/154, U.N. Doc A/RES/65/154 (Dec. 
20, 2010) available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/154.  
15 International Decade for Action ‘Water for Life’ 2005–2015, UN.ORG (last updated Mar. 29, 
2014), available at http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/transboundary_waters.html. 
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violence” resulting from transboundary water problems during that same 
time frame.16 As the world’s climate continues to change and as the 
demand for fresh water 17  increases, experts believe that violence 
stemming from water disputes will increase and become more severe.18 
Even if no violence results from transboundary water disputes, a 
worldwide decrease in drinkable water should concern the international 
community because such a decrease may cause potential violations of 
international law.19 This Part demonstrates that a decrease in fresh water 
is inevitable and that this decrease will likely cause nations to violate 
international law.  
 
A. Inevitable Decrease in Fresh Water 
 
Two current worldwide trends make it likely that the world’s fresh 
water supply will significantly decrease over the next few decades: 
climate change and an increasing global population.20   
Although there is some debate concerning the cause of the world’s 
climate change,21 it is clear that the climate is changing.22 A result of this 
change is that the earth’s supply of fresh water will become increasingly 
less abundant in areas where it is already sparse.23 A study on climate 
change indicates that, “semi-arid and arid areas are particularly exposed 																																								 																					
16 Id. 
17 Fresh water will be used to mean “water of sufficient quality to support its intended 
purpose—agriculture, electrical power generation, industrial processes, or human consumption.” 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at i.   
18 See, e.g., id. at 3 (“[W]e judge that as water shortages become more acute beyond the next 10 
years, water in shared basins will increasingly be used as leverage; the use of water as a weapon or 
to further terrorist objectives also will become more likely beyond 10 years.”).  
19 See infra Part II.B. 
20 UNITED NATION HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., THE RIGHT TO WATER 35 (2010), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet35en.pdf (“Water scarcity currently affects 
four out of every ten people in the world. The situation is worsening owing to population growth, 
urbanization, pollution of water resources and the impact of climate change.”). 
21 See Dana Nuccitelli, Global Warming is Being Caused by Humans, Not the Sun, and is 
Highly Sensitive to Carbon, New Research Shows, GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2014, 09:00 EST), available 
at http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2014/jan/09/global-
warming-humans-not-sun; but see Lawrence Solomon, Why Humans Don't Have Much to Do With 
Climate Change, HUFFINGTON POST (9 Dec. 2013, 6:27 PM), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/lawrence-solomon/global-cooling_b_4413833.html (“By the broader 
standard of the last century of science – and the centuries that preceded it – what's outlandish is 
attributing massive changes in climate to increases in carbon dioxide, a trace gas that represents so 
miniscule a fraction of our atmosphere that it must be measured in parts per million.”).  
22 Puneet Kollipara, Sick of the Winter Chill? New Research Shows Why the Planet is Still 
Heating Up, WASH. POST (24 Mar. 2014, 7:52 PM), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/03/24/sick-of-the-winter-chill-new-
research-shows-why-the-planet-is-still-heating-up/ (noting that “[t]hirteen of the 14 warmest years 
on record have occurred in the 21st century”). 
23  Joseph W. Dellapenna, A Climate of Disruption: Legal Measures for Adaptation and 
Mitigation: International Water Law in a Climate of Disruption, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 43, 48 
(2008) (citing Seth Borenstein, Weather Drier as Tropics Expand, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 3, 2007)); 
Noah D. Hall, Bret B. Stuntz & Robert H. Abrams, Climate Change and Freshwater Resources, 22 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 30, 31 (2008); Pius Z. Yanda, Drying of Lake Jipe: Is It a Climatic 
and/or Human Induced Phenomenon?, 5 ICFAI J. ENVTL. ECON. 7 (2007) (“We face a world in 
which the arid regions will become wider and drier, while melting glaciers and mountain snowpack 
threaten to deprive those regions of their summer water supplies.”). 
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to the impacts of climate change on water resources.”24 The study further 
suggests that, “many of these areas (e.g., the Mediterranean Basin, 
western United States, southern Africa, northeast Brazil, southern and 
eastern Australia) almost certainly will suffer a decrease in water 
resources due to climate change.”25 In other words, climate change will 
make arid areas more arid. The depletion of fresh water in these areas 
will be exacerbated by the growing demand for water throughout the 
world.  
Based on the current rate of growth, experts predict that the world’s 
population will reach 9.6 billion by 2050.26 As the world’s population 
increases, so will the demand for water. More water will be needed to 
satisfy the increased population’s needs. For example, according to a 
U.S. Intelligence Community Assessment, “Agriculture, which accounts 
for approximately 3,100 bcm . . . will, if current practices and 
efficiencies continue, require 4,500 bcm . . . by 2030.”27 This means that 
in order to sustain life, humans will collectively have to use more water 
in the future, even as the amount of water available to them—which is 
already only marginally sufficient in some areas—is on the decline. Such 
a predicament could cause nations to violate international law either by 
failing to provide sufficient water to their citizens or by employing 
unacceptable means to acquire sufficient water for their citizens.   
 
B. Potential International Law Violations 
 
There are at least three international laws that nations could 
potentially violate as a result of transboundary water disputes: 
international law guaranteeing adequate drinking water, international law 
concerning the sharing of transboundary water resources, and the UN’s 
prohibition on the use of force.  
On July 28, 2010, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 
64/292, which officially recognized “the right to safe and clean drinking 
water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full 
enjoyment of life and all human rights.”28 The ultimate objective of the 
resolution was for all nations to take efforts “to provide safe, clean, 
accessible and affordable drinking water and sanitation for all.”29 The 
UN stated that the quantitative goal to meet this objective is to provide 																																								 																					
24 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 1. 
25 Id. 
26 World Population Projected to Reach 9.6 Billion by 2050 – UN Report, UN NEWS CENTRE 
(June 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45165#.UzZdjf37Ca4. 
27 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 2. 
28  G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010) available at 




“between 50 and 100 litres of water per person per day” for a cost “not to 
exceed 3 per cent of household income.”30 Additionally, “the water 
source has to be within 1,000 metres of the home and collection time 
should not exceed 30 minutes.”31  
Although General Assembly resolutions do not automatically 
constitute binding international law, they may signal binding customary 
international law when coupled with opinio juris. 32  Thus, General 
Assembly resolution 64/292 is binding upon all nations that believe they 
are legally bound by it. To avoid violating international law, these 
nations must take steps to meet the UN’s goal of providing safe and 
clean drinking water to all of their citizens.  
If, on the other hand, nations are too ambitious to provide their 
citizens with a sufficient amount of water, they may violate their duties 
to appropriately share transboundary water resources. Similar to their 
obligations to provide adequate drinking water, nations’ duties to 
appropriately share transboundary water may constitute binding 
customary law.33 State practice of appropriately sharing transboundary 
water could be demonstrated by the Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigable Uses of International Watercourses.34 The convention directs 
that “[w]atercourse [nations] shall in their respective territories utilize an 
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner . . . 
taking into account the interests of the watercourse [nations] concerned, 
consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.”35 Additionally, 
watercourse nations “shall . . . take all appropriate measures to prevent 
the causing of significant harm to other watercourse [nations].”36  
Despite the fact that the Convention never came into force, the ICJ 
has implied that the Convention may be sufficient to establish state 
practice.37  Therefore, nations that believe they are legally bound to 
follow the Convention will likely have to adhere to its principles. Such 																																								 																					
30 Global Issues: Water, UN.ORG, available at https://www.un.org/en/globalissues/water/ (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2014). 
31 Id. 
32 See A. Mark Weisburd, The International Court of Justice and the Concept of State Practice, 
31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 295, 330 (2009) (citing Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. 
Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Dec. 19, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 271, 322–23 (2006)) (noting that in past cases, the 
International Court of Justice has ruled that a principle “was a matter of customary international law, 
[relying] solely on several General Assembly resolutions as support for that conclusion, despite the 
lack of binding legal effect in General Assembly resolutions”). The requirement of opinio juris can 
be summarized as follows: “For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law 
it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmt. c (1987) (emphasis added). 
33 Customary law can be established even without a General Assembly resolution as long as 
there is an established state practice that is combined with opinion juris—a sense of legal obligation. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 (1987). 
34 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, G.A. 
Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess. (May 21, 1997). 
35 Id. at art. 5. 
36 Id. at art. 7. 
37 Weisburd, supra note 32, at 324 (“[In] Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project the Court rested its 
discussion of riparian states' CIL rights to the use of international watercourses in part on the 
adoption of the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigable Uses of International Watercourses by the 
General Assembly, even though that Convention has never come into force.”).  
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nations have a duty to use (and impliedly, share) transboundary water in 
a reasonable manner that does not cause significant harm to their 
neighbors. Consequently, if these nations consume too much of a 
transboundary watercourse, they would violate international law. 38 
However, this is not the worst possible violation of international law that 
may arise from transboundary water disputes.   
In addition to potentially hoarding this valuable resource, nations 
may become so desperate for water that they could resort to the use of 
force—or the threat of such use—against their neighbors to acquire or 
preserve a sufficient water supply.39 Unlike the international laws that 
have already been discussed, the prohibition of the use of force is 
binding upon every nation in the world.40 The UN has not specifically 
defined the term “force,” but it is clear that if one nation attacks another 
nation with military forces, that constitutes a use of force.41  
There are only three scenarios in which a nation’s use of force would 
be justified within the framework of the UN Charter and would, 
therefore, not violate international law. The first is if—pursuant to 
articles 39, 41, and 42 of the UN Charter—the Security Council 
authorizes the use of force after deeming that other measures have 
been—or would be—inadequate to preserve international peace and 
security.42 The second is if the nation against whom another nation uses 
force consents to that use of force.43 The final justification for the use of 
force is self-defense. Regarding self-defense, Article 51 of the UN 
Charter clarifies that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack 																																								 																					
38 Not allowing a neighboring nation to obtain a significant amount of water from a shared 
watercourse would almost certainly cause that nation significant harm. 
39 Though this may seem far-fetched, there is good reason to believe that some nations may 
resort to violence to obtain the water they want or need. See infra, e.g., Part VI.B. 
40 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”) (emphasis added); see also 
Norman G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors Under International Law: An 
Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 331, 339 (2003) 
(“This prohibition has been extended to nations that are not part of the United Nations as well. The 
use of force regime outlined above is recognized as customary international law, meaning that it is 
binding upon all states, even those few states that do not belong to the UN.”). 
41 Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in 
Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J. LAW & TECH 415, 514 (2012) (“Some scholars have noted that it is unclear 
what a ‘use of force’ is under Article 2(4). [But] [c]onventional weapon attacks definitely fall within 
the category of ‘use of force’ in Article 2(4) . . . .”).  
42  U.N. Charter art. 42 (“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of 
Members of the United Nations.”) (emphasis added). 
43 See THOMAS M. DONNELLY ET AL., OPERATION JUST CAUSE: THE STORMING OF PANAMA 
(1991). An example of this is when the United States received consent from Panama to use force to 
reestablish the newly elected President of Panama. Although some considered this action 
questionable, the action was ultimately allowable within the international community.   
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occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security.”44 It is important to note that the right to self-defense exists 
only after an “armed attack” occurs. A mere use of force—if it 
constitutes something less than an armed attack—might not justify a 
nation to use its own force in self-defense.45 
Although these exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force exist, 
they are sufficiently narrow that only rarely would a nation be able to 
employ the use of force to resolve a transboundary water dispute without 
violating binding international law. It seems unlikely, for example, that 
one nation would ever consent to allow another nation to use force to 
settle a water dispute between the two nations. Moreover, unless the 
conduct of another party to a transboundary water dispute constitutes a 
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression,46 
neither of the other exceptions will apply. Hence, if nations resort to the 
use of force against each other to resolve a transboundary water dispute, 
at least one of them will almost certainly violate international law. 
Because it is very likely that water-deprived nations will eventually 
resort to the use of force to resolve transboundary water disputes,47 it 
seems inevitable that some nations will violate international law as a 
result of such disputes. However, if the international community can step 
in and help nations resolve their transboundary water disputes before the 
disputes become too heated, it is possible that all of these disputes could 
be settled in a way that prevents violations of international law.  
 
III. INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
 
The danger of unresolved transboundary water disputes has become 
increasingly apparent. Thus, scholars have increasingly suggested 
methods for how these disputes should be resolved. Relevant scholarship 
addressing transboundary water disputes can largely be separated into 
two groups:48 1) scholarship focused on potential resolutions to specific 
disputes and 2) scholarship focused on providing a general system for 
resolving all potential transboundary disputes.  
																																								 																					
44 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
45 U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations . . . .”).  
46 “Threat to the peace,” “breach of the peace,” and “act of aggression” are all terms of art used 
in Article 39 of the UN Charter. U.N. Charter art. 39. These terms will be discussed more in-depth 
later in the paper. See infra Part VII. 
47 See infra Part VI.B. 
48 A third, less relevant group also exists. This group applies principles of international water 
law to propose solutions to interstate water disputes in the United States. See e.g. Eva Melody 
LaManna, Three’s a Crowd: Examining Georgia’s Options in the Tri-State Water Wars Under 
Principles of International Law, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 215 (2010); Robert H. Abrams, 
Boundary Water Treaty Centennial Symposium: The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 as a Model 
for Interjurisdictional Water Governance, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1635 (2008). 
SUMMER	2015																																					Resolving	International	Water	Disputes		
140		
1) A portion of the scholarship addressing transboundary water 
disputes is centered on individual disputes. These articles suggest which 
currently-existing dispute resolution mechanisms would best serve the 
particular disputing nations. Several articles suggest that specific 
regional water disputes are best resolved through reaching a multilateral 
agreement.49 Others suggest that the specific disputing nations should 
enact a treaty that establishes a joint management institution.50 Still 
others suggest more unique solutions to specific problems, such as 
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian water dispute by “progressively 
establish[ing] a solid basis for long-term sustainable arrangements . . . 
[starting] with a non-binding flexible arrangement that will serve the 
short-term need, and gradually [building] up into a final, legally binding 
arrangement based upon international law.” 51  While the different 
solutions suggested in these articles could be applied to many 
transboundary water disputes, the articles were not—strictly speaking—
intended to propose a blueprint for how all transboundary water disputes 
should be resolved.52 
2) The second group of scholarship, however, focuses on proposing 
general solutions that can be applied in settling all transboundary water 
disputes. Some articles, for example, suggest that in light of the projected 
effects of climate change, existing international water laws must be 
reformed. 53 According to one article, this reformation must “[strengthen] 																																								 																					
49 See, e.g., Elizabeth Burleson, Equitable and Reasonable Use of Water Within the Euphrates-
Tigris River Basin, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10041, 10054 (2005) (discussing the water trouble within the 
Euphrates-Tigris River Basin and concluding that “[u]ntil a multilateral agreement is reached, water 
projects such as GAP will destabilize Middle Eastern relations. A long-term commitment to 
equitable and reasonable use allows water allocations to be altered if use becomes inequitable or 
unreasonable”); Nicholas Maxwell, The Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System: Thoughts on a 
Multilateral Treaty in Light of the 2008 UN Resolution on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 46 
TEX. INT'L L.J. 379, 409 (2011) (“Hopefully, after the NAP concludes, the Nubian states will make 
good on this pledge to be an example for the rest of the world by ratifying one of the first 
comprehensive multilateral transboundary aquifer treaties.”). 
50 See e.g. Elizabeth Burleson, Middle Eastern and North African Hydropolitics: From Eddies 
of Indecision to Emerging International Law, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 385, 423–24 (2006) 
(analyzing “Middle Eastern and North African hydropolitics in light of emerging international law” 
and concluding that “[e]xisting co-aquifer arrangements indicate that establishing a joint 
management institution would enable versatile and timely responses to variable water conditions.”); 
Yaser Khalaileh, Prospects for Cooperation and Dispute Over Water in the Middle East, 5 
BERKELEY J. MID. EAST & ISLAMIC L. 73, 117 (2012) (“To achieve genuine success of any 
conclusive agreement in that direction, it should include provisions for the establishment of an 
International Joint Commission for the Jordan River Basin along the lines of the International Rhine 
Commission.”). 
51 Fadia Daibes, A Progressive Multidisciplinary Approach for Resolving the Palestinian Israel 
Conflict over the Shared Transboundary Groundwater: What Lessons Learned from International 
Law?, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 93, 94 (2004). 
52 Admittedly, this may ultimately be the most effective strategy for solving transboundary 
water disputes because no two disputes—even those involving the same general resource—are likely 
to be exactly the same.  
53 See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 23, at 94 (2008) (“Global climate disruption is occurring 
and will challenge many or most aspects of human activity. Perhaps the greatest challenges will 
relate to the availability of water to meet the needs of humans and other living things. These 
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the protections of water resources while devising appropriate 
arrangements for managing those resources to meet multiple needs.” 54 
Another article suggests that instead of allowing heads of state to 
negotiate transboundary water agreements, “negotiations [should] begin 
with a committee comprised of stakeholders . . . whose lives are 
impacted by the stream.”55 Other articles suggest that by combining the 
best attributes of the currently existing dispute resolution methods, 
nations will be much more able and willing to resolve their disputes.56  
Within all of the aforementioned scholarship, there is very little 
suggestion that the Security Council should take a more active role in 
settling transboundary water disputes.57 Moreover, none of the articles 
suggest that the Security Council should appropriate water between or 
among nations in any manner. This Comment argues that such 
appropriation by the Security Council is not only possible and allowable, 
but also beneficial. This argument starts with an investigation of the 
interstate water dispute resolution mechanisms employed by the United 
States and Canada. 
 
IV. UNITED STATES WATER LAW 
 
Although the United States government generally allows states to 
determine how water will be appropriated within their territories, the 
federal government has ultimately retained supremacy over water 
appropriations.58 This supremacy gives the federal government the ability 
to facilitate the resolution of interstate water disputes in three different 
ways: adjudication, interstate compacts, and congressional appropriation.  
 																																								 																																								 																																								 																
challenges will not be met unless existing laws and institutions are reformed to be able to cope with 
the changing situation.”). 
54 Id. 
55 Jeffrey S. Dornbos, All (Water) Politics is Local: A Proposal for Resolving Transboundary 
Water Disputes, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 18 (2010) (“Transboundary water agreements 
should include a rebuttable presumption that negotiations over transboundary water disputes begin 
with regional committees organized at the ‘lowest’ appropriate hydrological level. This argument 
has two components. First, it requires regional committees to be organized by hydrologic units, such 
as watersheds. Second, it requires beginning dispute resolution with the ‘lowest’ - or most local - 
hydrologic unit. For example, if the dispute is over a small border stream that feeds into Lake 
Michigan, negotiations would begin with a committee comprised of stakeholders, from both the 
United States and Canada, whose lives are impacted by the stream, as opposed to the President of the 
United States and the Prime Minister of Canada, who are not as directly impacted.”). 
56 See, e.g., Anna Spain, Beyond Adjudication: Resolving International Resource Disputes in 
an Era of Climate Change, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 343, 390 (2011) (suggesting “that one way to 
[adequately resolve transboundary water disputes] is to combine adjudication with non-judicial 
forms of IDR in an integrated manner. When we recognize the benefits of mediation and facilitation, 
we can incorporate them in ways that complement the existing international legal system”). 
57 But see Burleson, supra note 49, at 10049 (“If these states prove unable to establish such an 
institution or the institution is unable adequately to address problems that arise, then the United 
Nations should once again provide assistance. Gross violations of equitable and reasonable 
utilization should be subject to U.N. sanctions.”). 
58 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 587 (1963) (“While the States were generally free to 
exercise some jurisdiction over these waters before the Act [which appropriated the Colorado River 
between California and Arizona] was passed, this right was subject to the Federal Government's 





Perhaps the most well-known method of resolving an interstate water 
dispute in the United States is adjudication. This method is initiated 
when one state unilaterally files suit against another state or multiple 
states. The Constitution of the United States provides that “[i]n all Cases 
. . . in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original 
Jurisdiction.”59 The Supreme Court has held that original jurisdiction in 
these cases typically equates to exclusive jurisdiction.60 Consequently, in 
the United States all lawsuits involving interstate water disputes go 
directly to the Supreme Court.  
In resolving these disputes, the Supreme Court utilizes the doctrine 
of equitable apportionment.61 The Court described how this doctrine 
functions in Nebraska v. Wyoming:62  
Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But 
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of 
water in the several sections of the river, the character 
and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, 
the availability of storage water, the practical effect of 
wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to 
upstream areas as compared to the benefits to 
downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the 
former–these are all relevant factors. They are merely an 
illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue.63 
Once the Court decides the equitable resolution, its decision is binding 
on all of the parties involved. Such a resolution might be enviable for 
some parties because it allows unbiased judges to settle a dispute through 
employing principles of equity. The Court will always use these same 
principles of equity unless there is “special justification” for overriding 
precedent.64 This makes adjudication the most predictable method for 
settling interstate water disputes. Instead of having to speculate how 
other states will negotiate or how political pressures will affect 																																								 																					
59 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
60 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 657 (1838) (explaining that the Supreme Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction over cases in which a state is a party, except between a state and its 
citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other states or aliens; in which latter case, it 
shall have original, but not exclusive jurisdiction).  
61 This doctrine was initially set forth in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). 
62 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
63 Id. at 618. 
64 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“While stare decisis is not an 
inexorable command, particularly when we are interpreting the Constitution, even in constitutional 
cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from 
precedent to be supported by some special justification.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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congressional appropriation, adjudication allows disputing states to know 
what factors will determine their fate.  
On the other hand, there are also reasons why adjudication might not 
always be the best method for resolving interstate water disputes. One 
reason is that it can take several decades for the Supreme Court to reach 
a decision that entirely settles any given water dispute. One prominent 
example of how long the adjudication process can take comes from the 
dispute between Nevada and California over Lake Tahoe.65 Litigation in 
that dispute lasted nearly a century66 and the dispute was eventually 
resolved through other means. 67  In other words, not only can 
adjudication take an extremely long time to resolve a water dispute, it 
also can entirely fail to provide a true resolution. 
Another potential drawback of adjudication is that the members of 
the Supreme Court are not water experts and, consequently, may struggle 
to be truly equitable in appropriating water between or among states. As 
one scholar aptly stated, “[t]he sheer complexity of water conflicts alone 
is enough to keep them out of any court.”68 To offset this lack of 
expertise, the Court routinely delegates fact-finding duties to a Special 
Master and asks the Special Master for a recommendation for resolving 
the dispute. 69  This delegation helps the Court solve the expertise 
problem, but it does not solve the final problem with adjudication: it is an 
adversarial system.  
The adversarial nature of the United States judicial system makes 
adjudication a potentially problematic method for resolving interstate 
water disputes. Instead of helping states work together toward a common 
goal, adjudication in the United States encourages states to contest each 
other for every gallon of water.70 Thus, adjudication can potentially make 
water disputes more hostile even while technically settling the 
underlying dispute itself. The next American method of interstate water 																																								 																					
65 This dispute was ultimately settled through Congressional appropriation. See Fallon Paiute 
Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 3289, 3294 § 202 (1990). 
66 See E. Leif Reid, Ripples from the Truckee: The Case for Congressional Apportionment of 
Disputed Interstate Water Rights, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 166 (1995) (analyzing the dispute in 
great detail and pointing out that “[w]hen Congress opened negotiations and sponsored a new 
process to apportion the Tahoe Basin's waters between the numerous feuding claimants, it undertook 
to untie a knot that nearly one hundred years of litigation and forty years of negotiation had failed to 
unravel”). 
67 This dispute ended when, for the second time in its history, Congress stepped in and 
determined how water would be appropriated between the states on its own.  See id. at 166–67.  
68  Susan D. Brienza, Wet Water v. Paper Rights: Indian and Non-Indian Negotiated 
Settlements and Their Effects, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 151, 166 (1992) (pointing out that in addition to 
the complexity of water disputes in their own right, “[i]n water law disputes, a single plaintiff against 
a single defendant is a rarity because multiple competing parties are inherent in the issue”).  
69 See C. Hansell Watt, Who Gets the Hooch?: Georgia, Florida, and Alabama Battle for 
Water From the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1453, 1457 
(2004) (“Because courts lack the resources and expertise to evaluate most interstate water rights 
disputes, a Special Master is usually assigned ‘to hear evidence, preside over hearings, report 
findings, and recommend a solution.’” (citing Dustin S. Stephenson, The Tri-State Compact: Falling 
Water and Fading Opportunities, 16 FLA. ST. U. J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 83, 96 (2000)). 
70 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–41 (1937) (noting that the Constitution 
limits judicial jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies” and that “[t]he controversy must be definite 
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests”).  
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dispute resolution specifically addresses these problems but comes with 
drawbacks of its own.  
 
B. Interstate Compacts 
 
If states decide that they would like to settle a water dispute without 
judicial intervention, federal law permits them to do so through an 
interstate compact, with the consent of Congress.71 This is the judicially 
and congressionally preferred method for settling interstate disputes 
precisely because it avoids the pitfalls of adjudication and because it 
allows states to maintain some autonomy in resolving a dispute.72  
Interstate compacts allow states to decide their own fate through 
negotiation. This stems from the fact that interstate compacts function as 
contracts between states. For a compact to be valid, all of the legal 
requirements of a contract need to be present: namely, offer, acceptance, 
and consideration. 73  Just as with a traditional contract, the states 
negotiate the terms of the contract until they reach a result that is 
acceptable to all of the parties. The negotiation of an interstate water 
compact is ordinarily “handled by a group of representatives from each 
state appointed by the governors, often referred to as a ‘joint 
commission.’”74 Once they reach an acceptable compromise, each state 
must ratify the agreement by passing the exact language of the agreement 
through the applicable state legislative process.75  
This process provides disputing states with multiple opportunities to 
preserve the status quo if they are not completely satisfied with the 
proposed appropriation. After all, the states’ representatives to the joint 
commission, the state legislatures, and the governors all have an 
independent chance to approve or refuse the suggested compact. 
However, there is one significant limitation on states’ sovereignty in 
enacting interstate water compacts: federal law provides that states 
cannot enter into such compacts “without the Consent of Congress.”76 																																								 																					
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
72 David Elliott Prange, Regional Water Scarcity and the Galloway Proposal, 17 ENVTL. L. 81, 
88 (1986) (“Judicial and congressional preference for compacts follows primarily because the most 
frequent alternative to interstate compacts is equitable apportionment litigation. Litigation is less 
favored because it inevitably results in ad hoc resource allocation and because it requires the courts 
to delve into technical resource specialty areas with which they are essentially unfamiliar.”). 
73 Suzanne Zazycki, The Legal Structure of an Interstate Water Compact: Implications for a 
Great Lakes Interstate Water Compact, 5 TOL. J. GREAT LAKES' L. SCI. & POL'Y 459, 463 (2003).  
74 Id. at 465 (citing FREDERICK ZIMMERMAN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF 
INTERSTATE COMPACTS 16 (1976)). 
75 Id. at 466 (“To ratify, the compact is embodied in an ‘enabling statute’ and submitted to each 
state's legislature. An enabling statute is merely the statute that includes the language of the compact, 
as well as other language necessary to pass a statute in each state. Once passed by the state's 
legislature, it is submitted to the governor for a signature. If the governor vetoes it, then, like any 
other statute, it can go back to the state legislature for a veto override.”). 
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.  
INTERNATIONAL	LAW	&	MANAGEMENT	REVIEW																																					VOLUME	11	
145		
While obtaining congressional consent is not typically a problem, there 
has been at least one instance where a lack of congressional consent was 
the only thing that prevented disputing states from resolving their dispute 
through a compact. 77  Because Congress has demonstrated that it is 
willing to negate interstate compacts in certain circumstances, states do 
not retain as much autonomy through this method as it may originally 
appear.  
Another potential problem with interstate compacts is that states face 
the same problems faced by individuals entering into a contract. Just as 
there are occasionally dominant parties among those involved in a 
traditional contract, there can also be dominant parties among 
compacting states. California’s quest to obtain adequate water for the 
millions of people who live in the southern portion of the state 
demonstrates the potential for this sort of dominance. 78  The main 
problem is that the more powerful (i.e. more populous and well-funded) 
states might try to dominate the terms of a compact because they know 
that Congress will not allow large cities to go without water. However, 
the requirement for congressional approval might also prevent states 
from dominating compacts. Additionally, if Congress is really worried 
about this potential problem, it can circumvent the interstate compact 
process altogether and unilaterally appropriate water among the disputing 
states.  
 
C. Congressional Appropriation 
 
The United States has utilized the final American method for 
resolving interstate water disputes only in extremely rare circumstances, 
and where neither adjudication nor interstate compact was able to settle a 
dispute. 79  In these rare situations, Congress passes legislation that 
appropriates water between or among disputing states in a binding 
fashion. Although the Supreme Court has held that Congress has the 
authority to act in this manner,80 Congress has chosen to do so on only 
two occasions.81   
While this method of resolution may initially seem to undercut any 
semblance of state sovereignty concerning water rights, a closer 																																								 																					
77 The same dispute concerning Lake Tahoe between Nevada and California that went through 
near-endless litigation was hampered by Congressional disapproval of proposed compacts because 
the compacts did not adequately consider the needs of federally recognized Native American Tribes. 
See Reid, supra note 66. 
78 See, e.g., MARK REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 293–94 (3d ed.1993).  
79 Although it seems that Congress has the power to appropriate water among disputing parties 
even before all other dispute resolution methods have failed, Congress has never utilized this power. 
80 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 557.  
81 See id. at 560 (noting that the “Boulder Canyon Project Act of December 21, 1928, 45 Stat. 
1057. . . was a complete statutory apportionment intended to put an end to the long-standing dispute 
over Colorado River waters”); Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 
1990, 104 Stat. 3289, 3294 § 202 (1990) (providing “for the equitable apportionment of the waters 
of the Truckee River, Carson River, and Lake Tahoe between the State of California and the State of 
Nevada”).   
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inspection reveals that states maintain a good deal of sovereignty. In 
cases where Congress appropriates water between or among states 
through legislation, state sovereignty is maintained because “[t]he States, 
subject to subsequent congressional approval, [are] also permitted to 
agree on a compact with different terms” than the congressional 
appropriation.82 This means that, unlike with adjudication, states can 
potentially overrule congressional appropriation by subsequently 
agreeing to an interstate compact. As mentioned above,83 Congress will 
still have to approve the interstate compact—and representatives may be 
more likely to veto an interstate compact if it attempts to override 
Congress’s own appropriation than they would if Congress had not 
already appropriated the water. However, the possibility remains that a 
state can reclaim control of its own fate.  
In addition to preserving some state sovereignty, this method is 
helpful because interstate water disputes can be resolved more quickly 
and with more expertise through congressional appropriation than 
through the judicial system. Although the process for congressional 
appropriation may take a few years, this is a very short time compared to 
the time adjudication can take.84 Additionally, instead of having to rely 
on a single Special Master to perform fact-finding functions and to 
provide recommendations, Congress can rely on agencies and other 
experts to provide those services.85 
Despite its positive characteristics, this method is not immune from 
shortcomings of its own. One major shortcoming is that Congress might 
not properly account for the disputing states’ specific needs and cultures. 
Although each state has a number of representatives in Congress, those 
representatives might not be capable of actually meeting their state’s 
needs. For example, although each state has an equal number of 																																								 																					
82 Id. at 565.  
83 See supra Part IV.B.  
84 Reid, supra note 66, at 178 (pointing out that in the Lake Tahoe dispute, Congressional 
apportionment helped “a seemingly intractable situation [to] resolve itself in relatively few years [it 
had failed to be solved after about 100 years of litigation], proving the superior efficiency of 
congressional division of water rights over both interstate compacting and adjudicatory 
apportionment”). 
85 For example, members of Congress receive information from congressional aides, agencies, 
and experts. Carter Moore, What Is Daily Life Like for a Member of Congress or Congressional 
Staffer?, SLATE, available at 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/quora/2013/11/07/congressional_staffers_what_s_it_like_to_work_for_a
_member_of_congress.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (describing the role of congressional aides); 
Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 1988), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/24/us/global-warming-has-begun-expert-tells-
senate.html (describing an early expert report given to a congressional committee); Black Carbon 
Report to Congress, EPA, available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/fedrgstr_activites/BC%20Report%20to%20Congress?Op
enDocument (last visited Jan. 20, 2015) (“The October 2009 Interior Appropriations bill (P.L. 111-
88) requires the EPA, in consultation with other Federal agencies, to prepare a comprehensive report 
to Congress on the climate effects of black carbon.”). 
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Senators, states like Wyoming and Montana elect only one of the 435 
members of the House of Representatives.86 This could be particularly 
problematic if one of these smaller states is disputing with a state like 
California—which elects fifty-three members of the House and could 
assumedly use its weight either to obtain a favorable apportionment or to 
at least drown out the voices of the smaller states.87   
The final pitfall of congressional appropriation is that the relevant 
decision-makers may tend to base an appropriation on what would least 
offend all of the disputing states rather than basing it on what is truly 
equitable. While the Justices of the Supreme Court can equitably resolve 
an interstate water dispute without worrying about any potential negative 
impact the decision might have on their jobs,88 politicians do not have 
this luxury. Consequently, politicians are much more likely to consider 
many non-equitable factors when deciding how to appropriate water. 89 
Such considerations might drive Congress to simply appropriate the 
water according to popular opinion across America, which might not be 
in the best interest of any of the disputing states.   
 
V. CANADIAN WATER LAW 
 
Unlike in the United States, it is the provinces—and not the federal 
government—that retain supremacy over water appropriation in 
Canada. 90  Consequently, the federal government generally resolves 
interprovincial water disputes only when the disputing parties explicitly 
allow federal intervention.91 Interprovincial agreements usually allow 
this kind of intervention.92  
An important difference between Canadian interprovincial 
agreements and American interstate compacts is that no federal approval 
is required for an interprovincial agreement to become law. This means 
that provinces have a high level of autonomy in deciding how to resolve 
their own interprovincial water disputes. Despite this fact, some 																																								 																					
86  See Directory of Representatives, HOUSE.GOV, available at 
http://www.house.gov/representatives/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).  
87 Id. 
88 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour . . . ”). 
89 For example, politicians will likely consider what their constituents would want them to do 
and what their political allies would want them to do. 
90 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 5 
(Can.) § 92(13) (“In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to . . . 
Property and Civil Rights in the Province”); see also Frank Quinn, The Canadian View: Resolving 
Regulatory Disputes at Home and Abroad, 5 TOL. J. GREAT LAKES’ L. SCI. & POL’Y 473, 473 
(2003) (“Since water, in law, is traditionally regarded as property and land is taken to include water, 
the provinces have assumed the primary role for managing water in Canada. Within their boundaries, 
they really are sovereign.”). 
91 Quinn, supra note 90, at 475 (“Canadian courts have no authority to resolve interprovincial 
conflicts comparable to that exercised by the U.S. Supreme Court in interstate conflicts. Canada's 
senior governments tend to negotiate arrangements with one another rather than test the legal limits 





provinces have pre-authorized the federal government to settle their 
water disputes if such disputes arise.93 The Prairie Provinces Water 
Agreement (PPWA) is one example of such authorization.94 The PPWA 
is an agreement among Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan that 
determines how the three provinces will allocate water among and 
between each other and how any resulting disputes will be resolved.95 
This is perhaps the most prominent interprovincial water agreement in 
Canada,96 and it appears to be instructive in demonstrating how water 
disputes are generally resolved in Canada. The PPWA essentially 
provides for two separate methods for resolving disputes: adjudication 




The Master Agreement for the PPWA authorizes federal adjudication 
as a primary method for resolving water disputes among and between 
Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan. Section 8 of the Mater Agreement 
reads as follows:  
 
The parties agree, subject to Clause 9 of this 
agreement that if at any time, any dispute, difference or 
question arises between the parties with respect to this 
agreement or the construction, meaning and effect 
thereof, or anything therein, or the rights and liabilities 
of the parties thereunder or otherwise in respect thereto, 
then every such dispute, difference or question will be 
referred for determination to the Federal Court of 
Canada, Trial Division, under the provisions of the 
Federal Court Act of Canada and each of the parties 
hereto agrees to maintain or enact the necessary 
legislation to provide the Federal Court of Canada with 
jurisdiction to determine any such dispute, difference, or 																																								 																					
93 See, e.g., 1969 Master Agreement on Apportionment, PRAIRIE PROVINCES WATER BOARD, 
available at http://www.ppwb.ca/information/109/index.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (agreeing 
among Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba to take all water disputes to the Federal Court system). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 J. Owen Saunders & Michael M. Wenig, Whose Water? Canadian Water Management and 
the Challenges of Jurisdictional Fragmentation, in EAU CANADA: THE FUTURE OF CANADA’S 
WATER 129–30 (Karen Bakker, ed., 2007) (noting that the PPWA “was generally considered to be 
the template for” the water negotiations between provinces and territories in the Mackenzie River 
basin).   
97 The agreement also established a water board that makes other decisions. “Board members 
are senior officials engaged in the administration of water resources in each province of Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, and Manitoba and in the federal Departments of Environment and Agriculture and 
Agri-Food.” Prairie Provinces Water Board, ENV’T CAN., available at http://www.ec.gc.ca/eau-
water/default.asp?lang=En&n=BAB691E4-1 (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
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question in the manner provided under the Federal Court 
Act of Canada.98 
In practice, however, “very few jurisdictional disputes involving water 
resources have been litigated in Canada, compared with the United 
States.”99 This stems from the fact that although “the parties have agreed 
to take [the dispute] to the Federal Court of Canada for resolution . . . any 
one of the disputing parties can withdraw from that commitment.”100 In 
fact, interprovincial water disputes are litigated so rarely that there does 
not appear to be an established legal test for Canadian courts to use when 
they decide interprovincial water dispute cases.101 
B. Further Interprovincial Agreements 
 
The more common method for resolving interprovincial water 
disputes in Canada is simple: the provinces work out additional 
interprovincial agreements. According to one Canadian water law 
scholar, when there is a dispute among provinces, “Canada's senior 
governments tend to negotiate arrangements with one another rather than 
test the legal limits of their power to act unilaterally.”102 Additionally, the 
Master Agreement of the PPWA itself allows provinces to alter the 
PPWA “by an agreement in writing among the four parties to the Master 
Agreement.”103 One such further agreement came in 1992, when the four 
parties to the PPWA all agreed to include water quality objectives and 
“made limited provision for the consideration of groundwater matters 
that have interprovincial implications.”104 Further agreements like this 
one allow the provinces to settle disputes on their own rather than forcing 
them to relinquish the decision-making power to a court—thus making 
these agreements the preferred method of water dispute resolution in 
Canada.   
Finally, it is worth noting that unlike the United States, Canada does 
not use any form of legislative appropriation to settle interprovincial 
water disputes.   
																																								 																					
98 1969 Master Agreement on Apportionment, supra note 93 (emphasis added).  
99 Quinn, supra note 90, at 475. 
100 Id. 
101 The author could not find any Canadian court cases in which a court appropriated water 
between or among provinces nor could the author find a summary of any such cases.  
102 Quinn, supra note 90, at 473 
103 1969 Master Agreement on Apportionment, supra note 93. 
104 David R. Percy, Resolving Water-Use Conflicts: Insights from the Prairie Experience for 




VI. TRANSBOUNDARY WATER DISPUTES AND 
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE U.S. AND CANADA 	
For obvious reasons, 105  the international community generally 
functions differently than the two federal systems previously discussed. 
However, because transboundary water disputes arise from the same 
difficulties that cause interstate water disputes, 106  it seems that the 
international community can learn from federalist approaches in 
resolving these disputes. This Part will briefly outline how the 
international community currently resolves transboundary water disputes. 
It will then apply federalist approaches to demonstrate how the 
international community can change to prevent transboundary water 
disputes from becoming overly hostile. 
 
A. International Water Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 
On their face, transboundary water disputes are typically resolved in 
a manner that is very similar to how interprovincial water disputes are 
resolved in Canada. The most important similarity is that just as the 
Canadian provinces are ultimately sovereign over the water within their 
jurisdictions, individual nations are ultimately sovereign over the water 
within their boundaries. Another similarity is that, just like Canada, the 
international community has no dispute resolution mechanism that 
resembles legislative appropriation.   
Due to these similarities, it comes as no surprise that the most 
common method of resolving transboundary water disputes is simply 
allowing the disputing nations to negotiate a mutually beneficial treaty.107 
One illustrative transboundary water treaty is the Boundary Waters 
Treaty of 1909 between the United States and Canada.108 This treaty 
serves three major functions. First, it ensures that the navigable waters 
that intersect the shared boarder will remain “free and open for the 
purposes of commerce to the inhabitants and to the ships, vessels, and 
boats of both countries equally.”109 Second, it creates a joint commission 
made up of six commissioners—three from each nation—to examine any 
transboundary water difficulties that arise between the two nations.110 
Third, it creates a base rule for how the water will be appropriated 
																																								 																					
105 See supra note 11. 
106 See supra note 12. 
107 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (indicating that there have been over 150 water 
treaties in the international community in the last 50 years).  
108 Boundary Waters Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit. art. 1, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (Can). 
109 Id. at arts. 3, 7, 9. 
110 Id. at arts. 3–7. 
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between the two nations and requires that future appropriations be 
approved by the joint commission.111  
While the treaty is not perfect,112 it has lasted in its original form for 
over a century and has been instrumental in resolving subsequent water 
disputes between the two nations.113 The treaty’s ability to resolve water 
disputes in a peaceful manner makes it a successful treaty by 
international law standards.114  
Other nations involved in transboundary water disputes are 
encouraged to establish similarly successful treaties through negotiation, 
mediation, arbitration, and various other means. While each treaty 
ultimately needs to prevent transboundary water disputes from becoming 
overly hostile,115 each treaty can otherwise be as unique as the disputing 
nations desire it to be.116 This flexibility allows disputing nations to base 
transboundary water treaties on each nation’s wants, needs, and culture. 
Consequently, each nation’s sovereignty is completely preserved, subject 
only to the sovereignty of the neighboring nations.   
Resolving a water dispute through a treaty also allows disputing 
nations to create goodwill between and among each other. For example, 
if culturally opposed nations are able to cooperate in creating a mutually 
beneficial boundary water treaty, it could help them become more 
tolerant of each other in general. This increased tolerance could help the 
nations resolve other disputes as well.  
In addition to creating treaties, disputing nations can also submit the 
dispute to the ICJ.117 Similar to the Canadian adjudicatory system, the 
ICJ has jurisdiction over a transboundary water dispute only if the 
disputing parties mutually agree to be bound by the Court’s decision, or 
if the UN charter or some other treaty mandates ICJ action in the 
particular dispute.118 Additionally, if nations choose to subject the dispute 
to the ICJ, they are still able to back out of litigation—even in the middle 
																																								 																					
111 Id. 
112  Noah D. Hall, Boundary Waters Treaty Centennial Symposium: Introduction-The 
Centennial of the Boundary Waters Treaty: A Century of United States-Canadian Transboundary 
Water Management, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1417, 1421 (2008) (describing complaints both the United 
States and Canada have with the Boundary Waters Treaty). 
113 Id. (describing the history of the Boundary Waters Treaty and discussing the role it has 
played in resolving transboundary water disputes between the United States and Canada).  
114 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 33 (“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a 
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”). 
115 Id. 
116 For example, each treaty need not create an identical joint commission—or even create one 
at all—but each must prevent the dispute from escalating.  
117 See, e.g., Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 37 I.L.M. 162 (1997). 
118 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(1) (“The jurisdiction of the Court 
comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter 
of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.”).  
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of the trial.119 These procedural measures allow nations to maintain their 
self-autonomy throughout the adjudicatory process. Unfortunately, this 
self-autonomy comes at a price: the international community is unable to 
use adjudication to settle overly hostile transboundary water disputes 
where one or more of the disputing nations refuse to participate in the 
adjudicative process.   
 
B. Lessons from Canadian and American Water Law 
 
Although the international community traditionally resolves water 
disputes in a manner similar to Canada’s approach, it will need to utilize 
a dispute resolution method not found in Canada in order to avoid an 
escalation of unresolved transboundary water disputes. Two major 
differences between Canadian provinces and the nations that are typically 
involved in transboundary water disputes create the need for a new 
dispute resolution method in the international community. First, there is 
less renewable water available in problematic areas of the world than 
there is in the problematic areas of Canada. Second, citizens of disputing 
nations do not share patriotic or other unifying ties. 
The scarcity of water available to disputing nations will likely lead to 
unresolved and overly hostile conflicts unless a new method of dispute 
resolution is established in the international community. One reason 
Canada is capable of resolving its interprovincial water disputes 
diplomatically is because the country has an estimated 2,902 km3 of total 
renewable water.120 Contrastingly, the disputing nations of Kenya and 
Uganda have only an estimated 30.7 km3 and 66 km3 of total renewable 
water, respectively.121 This contrast is even more startling when one 
considers the fact that Kenya is the most populous of the three countries 
and the fact that Uganda is only slightly less populous than Canada.122 
The substantial lack of water available to disputing nations creates a 
significant obstacle to the success of treaty negotiations that is not easy to 
overcome. Indeed, the scarcer the water supply is, the more desperate 
nations will become to obtain every ounce of water available, even if 
																																								 																					
119 See e.g. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (deciding a case after the United States had already backed out of the litigation—
to which the United States claims it is not bound). 
120  Total Renewable Water Resources, The World Factbook, CIA, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2201.html (last visited Sept. 19, 
2015) (listing the estimated total renewable water resources for each country of the world as of 
2011).  
121 Id.  
122  Kenya’s 2012 estimated population was 40,863,000, Canada’s was 34,207,000, and 
Uganda’s was 33,796,000. Countries of the World, WORLD ATLAS, available at 
http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/populations/ctypopls.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).  
INTERNATIONAL	LAW	&	MANAGEMENT	REVIEW																																					VOLUME	11	
153		
acquiring the water comes at the expense of neighboring nations.123 
There is evidence that the scarcity of other resources has caused 
international conflicts in the past,124 so conflicts from water scarcity 
would not be surprising.  
Additionally, the lack of patriotic or otherwise unifying ties among 
the citizens of disputing nations makes transboundary water disputes 
more difficult to resolve than interprovincial water disputes in Canada. 
As noted above, 125  Canadian provinces routinely settle their water 
disputes by having each province’s leaders meet and work through the 
problems until a solution is agreed upon. It seems likely that this routine 
works, at least partially, because the relevant leaders—and the people 
they represent—have an inherent respect for each other as fellow 
Canadians. However, in transboundary water disputes such respect is not 
inherent.126 In fact, many of the nations that are currently involved in 
water disputes are also involved in other disputes.127 This lack of unity 
and general cooperation among nations involved in water disputes 
increases the probability that the nations will have a difficult time 
agreeing to enter into a water treaty or to submit the dispute to the ICJ. 
In light of the unique difficulties of transboundary water disputes 
(relative to the difficulties of Canadian interprovincial water disputes), it 
is clear that the international community needs to adopt a new method 
for resolving water disputes that cannot be resolved by the disputing 
nations on their own. It is important to resolve such unsettled 
transboundary water disputes because unresolved disputes will likely 
escalate into dangerous situations in the future.128 This is especially true 
in light of predicted climate changes, which would increase water 
scarcity and further exasperate tensions between disputing nations.129 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate whether legislative 
appropriation—a water dispute resolution method that has been utilized 
by the United States but is currently absent in both Canada and the 
international community—could be successfully employed on an 
international level. 																																								 																					
123 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 4 (“We assess that during the 
next 10 years a number of states will exert leverage over their neighbors to preserve their water 
interests.”). 
124  John W. Maxwell & Rafael Reuveny, Resource Scarcity and Conflict in Developing 
Countries, 37 J. PEACE RES. 301, 315 (2000) (“Our model implies that, in the absence of effective 
humanitarian interventions, one may observe recurring phases of peace and conflict due to 
renewable resource scarcity.”). 
125 See supra Part V.B. 
126 After all, citizens of different nations, by definition, do not share national ties.  
127 Rose M. Mukhar, The Jordan River Basin and the Mountain Aquifer: The Transboundary 
Freshwater Disputes between Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians, 12 ANN. SURV. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 59, 85 (2006) (noting, in regards to water disputes in the middle east, “the 
existence of disputes in the region unrelated to water makes the resolution of water disputes much 
harder to achieve, since they can rarely be dealt with in isolation”). 
128 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 120–29 (explaining why transboundary water 
disputes are likely to become violent).  
129 See supra Part II.A (discussing, in part, the predicted effects of climate change on fresh 
drinking water).  
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In rare circumstances,130 an international body could, and arguably 
should, use legislative appropriation to settle overly hostile 
transboundary water disputes. Without such action, some disputes might 
never be resolved. After all, before legislative appropriation was 
employed in the United States, some interstate water disputes went 
unresolved for many decades.131 Additionally, as long as nations are 
allowed to supersede legislative action through a subsequently negotiated 
treaty, any international legislative action would allow nations to 
maintain some of their self-autonomy. 
 
VII. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
Because it would need to act only rarely—when there is at least a 
threat to the peace132—the UN Security Council could, and should, 
resolve certain transboundary water disputes through legislative 
appropriation, as permitted by the UN Charter. This Part will discuss the 
relevant articles of the UN Charter and demonstrate that the Security 
Council could appropriate water between or among disputing nations in a 
beneficial manner and in accordance with those articles. 
Articles 33 through 42 of the UN Charter permit the Security 
Council to settle international disputes. The first six of these articles 
require and encourage the pacific settlement of all disputes. The last four 
articles instruct the Security Council on the actions it may take to prevent 
a threat to the peace.  
When “the continuance of [a dispute] is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security,”133 Article 33 states that 
the parties to the dispute 134  “shall, first of all, seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
means of their own choice.”135 The Security Council is also authorized to 
“call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.”   																																								 																					
130 The international body would need to follow the United States’ lead and resolve water 
disputes through legislative appropriation only in rare occasion.  
131 See Reid, supra note 66 (explaining the dispute between California and Nevada). See, e.g., 
supra notes 120–29 and accompanying text (explaining why transboundary water disputes are likely 
to become violent).  
132 A “threat to the peace” is a term of art used in the UN Charter. See infra notes 148–50. 
133 The Security Council is authorized to investigate and make such a determination pursuant to 
Article 34 of the Charter. U.N. Charter art. 34 (“The Security Council may investigate any dispute, 
or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to 
determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance 
of international peace and security.”). 
134 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 583–84 (Bruno Simma et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2002) (“[I]t must be concluded that the members of the UN are the primary addressees 
here. . . . [But as] a rule of customary law, the obligation of peaceful settlement applies also to third 
party States that are not members of the UN.”). 
135 U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1. 
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In other words, parties to a transboundary water dispute that has not 
led to a breach of the peace are allowed to choose their own method for 
resolving the dispute, but the parties must actively seek to resolve the 
dispute in a peaceful manner.136 If disputing parties fail to resolve the 
dispute through a chosen method, the disputing parties may select 
another method, or resume any previously used method.137 They do not, 
however, become entitled to use an unpeaceful method.138 
During the dispute, any member of the UN, whether a party to the 
dispute or not, may “bring [the] dispute . . . to the attention of the 
Security Council.”139 Bringing a dispute to the attention of the Security 
Council is not simply informing it that the dispute exists. Instead, Article 
35 “provides a legal basis for all members of the UN to prompt the 
Security Council to act, provided certain prerequisites are met.”140 The 
Security Council is not obligated to act simply because a dispute has 
been referred to it under this provision.   
On the other hand, the Security Council is required to take some 
action if the requirements in Article 37 are met.141 This obligation is 
triggered when the following events all occur: first, the disputing nations 
must fail to resolve the dispute through the methods indicated in Article 
33. Second, at least one of the disputing parties must subsequently refer 
the dispute to the Security Council.142 Finally, the Security Council must 
“[deem] that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security.”143  Once these 
requirements are met, the Security Council must make a non-binding 
recommendation, either recommending a procedure for the disputing 
parties to use in settling their own dispute—pursuant to Article 36(1)—or 
																																								 																					
136  Despite this flexibility, Article 36(3) seems to indicate that the UN usually prefers that the 
disputing parties refer disputes to the ICJ. U.N. Charter art. 36, para. 3 (“In making 
recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that 
legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice 
in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.”); THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 134, at 583–84 (“In addition, Art. 36(3) provides that 
disputes should, as a general rule, be referred to the ICJ.”). Additionally, Article 36(1) allows the 
Security Council—at any time during the dispute, including at its inception—to offer a non-binding 
recommendation to the disputing parties as to which method of dispute resolution they should 
employ.  U.N. Charter art. 36, para. 1 (“The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the 
nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or 
methods of adjustment.”). THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 
134, at 628 (“Recommendations of the SC according to Art. 36(1) are not binding.”).  
137 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 134, at 587 (noting 
that if parties fail to resolve a dispute through any given method, they “are free once again to resort 
to a procedure already used”). 
138 Id. (“[B]ecause of the responsibility incumbent upon them, even in the event of a failure the 
parties are not entitled to break off mutual contact, but must continue their efforts with a view to 
resolving the controversy.”).  
139 U.N. Charter art. 35, para. 1. 
140 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 134, at 610. 
141 U.N. Charter art. 37.   
142 U.N. Charter art. 37, para. 1.  
143 U.N. Charter art. 37, para. 2.  
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recommending a specific solution to the dispute, such as how the water 
ought to be appropriated in a water dispute,144 under Article 37.145   
As it decides whether to take a more active role in the dispute, the 
Security Council is permitted to “call upon the parties concerned to 
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or 
desirable.”146 Such provisions usually include calling for “the suspension 
of hostilities, troop withdrawal, and the conclusion of or adherence to a 
truce,” and cannot go “further than pure ‘holding operations’, or 
[produce] more than ‘stand-still’ or ‘cooling-off’ effects.” 147  These 
provisional measures are meant to keep conflicts from boiling over while 
the Security Council makes a final decision.  
Regardless of any recommendations or provisions it makes (or 
chooses not to make), the Security Council may pass a binding 
decision—subject to the principals of Articles 41 and 42—upon 
disputing nations when it determines that a dispute has escalated to 
become a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression”148 Such action “need not be directed against a law-breaker 
but can be employed whenever this appears conducive to the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”149 Therefore, even if a 
conflict is not international per se, it can still prompt U.N. Security 
Council action—as was the case where a lack of food and commodities 
“essential for survival” in Somalia prompted Security Council 
intervention.150  Clearly a water dispute between or among different 
nations could be similarly destabilizing, if not more so,151 and could 
allow the Security Council to take action.    
If the Security Council decides to issue a binding resolution, it must 
first attempt to resolve the dispute through measures “not involving the 
use of force.”152 Article 41 lists several examples of such measures: 																																								 																					
144 U.N. Charter art. 37, para. 2 (“If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the 
dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall 
decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may 
consider appropriate.”). 
145 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 134, at 643. 
146 U.N. Charter art. 40.  
147 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 134, at 732. 
148 U.N. Charter art. 39. Article 39 creates a transition for the Security Council. Once a 
triggering condition has occurred, the Security Council is no longer constrained to simply giving 
recommendations, but it can begin to mandate action. The Security Council can still choose to make 
a non-binding recommendation. (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide 
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”) (emphasis added).   
149 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 134, at 739. 
150 S.C. Res. 751, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992) (condemning “all violations of 
international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including in particular the deliberate impeding 
of the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population “and 
“[a]cting under Chapter VII of the United Nations [to authorize] the Security-General and Member 
States . . . to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia”). 
151 See, e.g., infra Part VI.B (explaining why transboundary water disputes are likely to become 
violent). 
152 U.N. Charter arts. 41–42. 
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“These may include complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means 
of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”153 The 
Security Council has relied on Article 41 to create international criminal 
tribunals and interim administrations.154 If these peaceful measures are 
inadequate—or if the Security Council determines they would be 
inadequate—then the Security Council is permitted to apply stronger 
enforcement measures,155 up to and including, in “exceptional cases,”156 
the use of force. 
In applying the UN Charter to transboundary water disputes, Article 
41 appears to authorize the Security Council to appropriate water among 
disputing nations when there is a threat to the peace. It additionally 
appears to authorize the Security Council to create a dispute-specific 
water commission with neutral experts and representatives from each of 
the disputing nations to help the Security Council determine what an 
“equitable and reasonable” intermediate appropriation—the standard 
under the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses157— would be. 158 Such a commission could 
help all of the disputing nations ensure that their needs, wants, and 
concerns are appropriately considered. Because the Security Council has 
the ability to take any non-forceful measures to maintain international 
peace, it is not prohibited from being creative in this manner.  
Moreover, the Security Council could determine how the water 
should be appropriated in a stopgap— rather than a permanent—manner, 
while also recommending a course of action to help the disputing nations 
subsequently re-appropriate the water between or among themselves. If 
the disputing nations were successful in agreeing to their own 
appropriation plan, such a plan could replace the Security Council’s 
appropriation—just as a subsequent internally appointed administration 
has replaced interim administrations created by the Security Council in 
other cases.159 Thus, although the disputing nations would lose some self-
autonomy because their dispute would be—at least temporarily—settled 																																								 																					
153 U.N. Charter art. 41. 
154 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 134, at 740. 
155 U.N. Charter art. 42 (“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of 
Members of the United Nations.”). 
156 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 134, at 753. 
157 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 5, 
opened for signature May 21, 1997, 51 U.N.T.S. 869. 
158  See Michael Keene, The Failings of the Tri-state Water Negotiations: Lessons to be 
Learned from International Law, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 473, 485 (2004) (“The Indus Waters 
Treaty of 1960 demonstrates the effectiveness of the principle of equitable utilization. This doctrine 
emphasizes distribution of resources in the manner that is most beneficial to all the parties involved. 
Equitable utilization has proven to be a mainstay of international water rights negotiations. It 
transcends the limitations of the systems of water allocation in the negotiating countries.”). 
159 See, e.g., U.N. Mission Cuts Down Staff in Kosovo, CHINAVIEW.CN (Aug. 11, 2008, 23:35), 
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/11/content_9192628.htm (explaining that 
nine years after UN Security Council Resolution 1244 established an interim administration in 
Kosovo, the interim administration was being cut back, and also explaining that “[t]he process is 
expected to last for some months with most authorities transferred to the Kosovo government”).  
SUMMER	2015																																					Resolving	International	Water	Disputes		
158		
without their full consent, they would not be deprived of a voice in the 
decision-making process. 
This analysis demonstrates that the Security Council, within the 
United Nation’s established framework, has the authority to enact and 
enforce water appropriations. Doing so would help balance the 
international community’s need to settle heated transboundary water 
disputes with the disputing nations’ desire for continued self-autonomy. 
That does not mean, however, that this solution is immune to criticism. 
 
VIII. CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES 
 
One obvious criticism is that no international bodies—including the 
Security Council—have anywhere near as much binding authority over 
nations as the American Congress does over states.160 Consequently, 
critics might argue that the international community cannot successfully 
pattern a new dispute resolution mechanism after a mechanism used 
solely by the American Congress.  
It is true that the international community does not own the water 
involved in the disputes it seeks to resolve. Despite this fact, the Security 
Council has adequate authority under the UN Charter to enforce any 
water appropriation it determines is necessary under Articles 39 and 41.  
After all, the very articles that authorize the Security Council to 
appropriate water also provide examples of peaceful measures that can 
be used to enforce the appropriation.161 Additionally, if these peaceful 
measures prove inadequate at enforcing the appropriations (or the 
Security Council determines that they would be inadequate), the Security 
Council could authorize members of the United Nations—including the 
members of the Security Council itself—to use force in order to support 
the appropriation.162 Hence, the Security Council has the authority to 
make its water appropriations as binding as it wants them to be.   
A second potential criticism is that Security Council involvement in 
water appropriation might be just as likely to cause a war as to prevent 
one. It is at least plausible that some nations would use force to prevent 
any deprivation of their sovereignty—especially one that dispossessed 
them of a resource as vital as water. While several features of the 
proposed solution (including the fact that nations could supersede the 																																								 																					
160  See Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and 
International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 259 (2011) (“[I]nternational law is not law because it is (1) 
not backed by physically coercive sanctions and (2) not administered by members of the system in 
question.”). 
161 See Jeong Hwa Pires, North Korean Time Bomb: Can Sanctions Defuse It? A Review of 
International Economic Sanctions as an Option, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307 (1994) (discussing 
a study that concluded that “[e]conomic sanctions are most likely to be successful if they are targeted 
against a relatively weak and unstable country,” but also noting that “[e]ven if a particular exercise 
of sanctions is not successful in bringing about the desired policy changes, the imposition of 
sanctions plays an important role as a signal of disapproval which may cause alterations in political 
behaviors of other countries”). 
162 U.N. Charter art. 42.  
INTERNATIONAL	LAW	&	MANAGEMENT	REVIEW																																					VOLUME	11	
159		
Security Council’s appropriation and the fact that the nations’ own 
experts would play a significant role in recommending what the 
appropriation should be) are aimed at pacifying feuding nations, it must 
be conceded that a forced appropriation may nevertheless cause some 
nations to reach their boiling point.  
However, the Security Council may appropriate water between or 
among disputing nations only if it believes such action will “maintain or 
restore international peace and security.”163 Therefore, if it is foreseeable 
that such an action would actually lead to violence, the Security Council 
is not allowed (under those articles) to appropriate water. Moreover, the 
very threat that the Security Council might eventually make a binding 
appropriation may, in itself, encourage some nations to settle their 
transboundary water disputes before they become overly hostile. These 
nations might think that it is better to give up a little more water in a 
mutually beneficial compromise now than to potentially have a less 
favorable resolution forced upon them later.   
Finally, critics might point out that any Security Council 
appropriation would be susceptible to bias in favor of one of the 
disputing nations. This could be a serious problem because if a nation 
involved in a transboundary water dispute knew both that a Security 
Council appropriation was likely and that such appropriation would 
likely be favorable to that nation, then that nation might become entirely 
unwilling to cooperate with other nations involved in the dispute. A 
similar problem is also seen on the other end of Security Council 
appropriation. After such appropriation is made, a nation that received all 
it wanted from the appropriation would likely be unwilling to negotiate a 
subsequent appropriation with the other disputing nations. In either case, 
a refusal to cooperate with the other disputing nations would undercut 
the entire purpose behind Security Council appropriation because 
disfavored nations would be almost completely deprived of sovereignty 
over their water and the appropriation might fail to stabilize the dispute 
to any degree.164 This danger is counterbalanced by the fact that members 
of the Security Council can veto a biased appropriation and encourage 
the other members of the Council to adopt a more neutral appropriation. 
Thus, although not feasible or beneficial in every situation, Security 
Council appropriation is a viable dispute resolution mechanism for 




As the climate continues to change and as the world’s population 
continues to increase, the world’s water crises are inevitably going to 
become more severe. As many other scholars have noted, the current 
dispute resolution mechanisms utilized by the international community 
will be insufficient to handle the increasing severity of the water crises. 																																								 																					
163 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
164 See supra Part IV.C (discussing in part the susceptibility the American Congress has to base 
a legislative appropriation on the allocation that is the least offensive to all of the parties).  
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This Comment has demonstrated that one solution to this problem is for 
the international community to adopt a new dispute resolution 
mechanism that would follow the form of America’s past legislative 
appropriations. This can be accomplished by encouraging the UN 
Security Council to use its powers under Articles 39, 41, and 42 of the 
UN Charter to appropriate water among disputing nations when a 
transboundary water dispute becomes a threat to the peace. Although this 
mechanism is not perfect, and might not be the best option for every 
heated transboundary water dispute, it is a viable and beneficial 
supplement to the dispute resolution mechanisms that currently exist in 
the international community. 
